This paper develops a theory synthesizing credit-claiming and blameavoidance explanations of congressional behavior and evaluates it against asbestos policy in the United States from the I920S through the I980s.
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Charlotte Twight costs facing the public. Like the political leitmotifs of credit and blame, such transaction-cost augmentation is not confined to asbestos policymaking nor to the US Congress: it is a widespread, perhaps universal, characteristic of governments. Evidence regarding linkages between transaction-cost augmentation and political choices to claim credit or avoid blame therefore may prove useful to those analysing government policymaking in other nations and institutional contexts.
In the United States, despite knowledge of the dangers of asbestos dating from at least the mid-I930s, the government acted chiefly as a promoter of the industry well into the 1970s. This article analyses the US government's policy transition from promoter to regulator of the asbestos industry, with particular attention to the timing of that transition. It explains how optimal political strategies on this issue have changed over time by analysing determinants of congressional choices between credit-claiming and blame-avoidance strategies.' In so doing, the model describes public perceptions as both an endogenous product of politicians' information-cost manipulation and an exogenous constraint that changes in identifiable ways over time.
The analysis has important implications for public policy formulation both in the United States and in countries governed by different institutional structures. Most directly, political leaders in other nations and contexts may display credit-claiming and blame-avoidance patterns analogous to those observed here. Moreover, as noted above, mechanisms employed by politicians in this case -such as the transaction-cost augmenting devices described in section 3 -seem likely to characterize other nations' governmental institutions as well as other levels of government within the United States. It is clear, for example, that the US President and other heads of state routinely use transaction-cost augmentation in their efforts to claim credit and avoid blame (see Rose,
I977: I I-I4).
In more than one dimension, the asbestos problem appears representative of a broader class of policy issues that transcend narrowly national concerns. Section 2 of this paper summarizes key elements of the pertinent literature. Section 3 presents an extension of the theory that more fully unifies and integrates 'credit-claiming' and 'blame-avoidance' analyses of legislators' behavior. In section 4 we examine the US government's asbestos policy from the I920S through the i980s against the theoretical framework presented in previous sections. Section 5 suggests avenues for future research, including potential international application of the model. Information asymmetries are fundamental to politics. Although the existence of information asymmetries has been recognized for decades, only recently has research in the policy sciences begun to focus more fully on the ability of politicians and bureaucrats to exploit such asymmetries to serve their own ends. Recent studies -whether examining legislators' incentives to conceal private information strategically (Austen-Smith & Riker, I987, 1990) , bureaucrats' and legislators' mutual incentives to manipulate information given reciprocal informational uncertainties (Bendor et al., i987), government officials' incentives to conceal costs from the public (Higgs, I987) and use other strategies to enhance their autonomy (Nordlinger, 198I) What has not been done is to tie the new literature on governmental transaction-cost augmentation to existing insights into the politics of credit claiming and blame avoidance. As shown below, the synthesis of these approaches helps to explain the time path of politicians' policy choices.
Transaction-cost augmentation denotes efforts by government officeholders to increase politically relevant information costs as well as other costs (e.g., organizational costs) of collective political action (Twight, I988) . The target may be voters (as in the interaction between members of Congress and the public) or it may be particular groups within government (as in the interaction between an agency and a congressional oversight committee, or between committee members and Congress at large). Given the unavoidable existence of positive transaction costs in political settings, officeholders can and do augment those 'natural' transaction costs to expand their autonomy and thereby serve their own political ends.
Congressional examples of transaction-cost augmentation include euphemistic naming of statutes, concentrating the benefits and diffusing the harm associated with governmental actions, misrepresenting the anticipated consequences of legislation, concealing the costs of governmental actions, attaching parochial riders to politically safe bills, and the like.3 The common thread in these seemingly disparate examples is that each either raises information costs facing the public or raises other costs of collective action. If statutes are misleadingly named, if harmful consequences are distributed widely so as to reduce per capita costs and thereby dilute incentives for political resistance, if expected effects of legislation are misrepresented, if governmental costs are concealed, or if parochial riders are buried in politically safe bills -then the (transaction) cost to the public of perceiving and reacting politically to governmental actions increases. Congressional autonomy is thereby expanded.
Extending earlier work on 'fiscal illusion' (Buchanan, I967; West & Winer, I 980), recent studies have identified determinants of transactioncost augmentation and its implications for the efficiency characteristics of legislation (Twight, I988; Crew & Twight, 1990 ). An officeholder's decision favoring a transaction-cost-increasing measure, ceteris paribus, is expected to be a positive function of: the complexity of the issue, the existence of an appealing justification for the measure [Lindsay's (I976) 'fog factor'], the existence and magnitude of third-party payoffs, executive support and party support for the measure, expected positive impacts of the measure on the job security and perquisites of the legislator, and the perceived importance of the measure to constituents, inter I 58 Charlotte Twight alia. Such a decision is expected to be a negative function of media attention or other publicity highlighting the measure's transaction-costincreasing features. While ideology plays a more complex role, the model generates predictions about what types of transaction-cost-augmenting measures will be favored by those holding different ideological views (Twight, I988: I34-I35).
The passage of time plays a less determinate role in the model, since time may both mitigate complexity and facilitate entrenchment of interest groups. I will argue in the following pages that transaction-cost augmentation plays a dual yet complementary role with respect to a politician's choice between blame avoidance and credit claiming. On the one hand, the feasible bounds of transaction-cost augmentation determine which of these strategies will predominate regarding a particular policy issue at a given point in time. Once that strategy emerges, however, transactioncost augmentation then will be used in its service: that is, the specific types of transaction-cost augmentation employed will be determined by the credit-claiming or blame-avoiding objectives of legislators.
This intertwining of choice of optimal policy strategy and transactioncost augmentation is complex. The decisions involved are those of individual legislators, and they will vary depending upon individual objectives and constraints. Nonetheless, the common electoral objective coupled with officeholders' assumed responsiveness to marginal political costs and benefits enables us to predict changes in aggregate outcomes. In fact, there are at least four possible scenarios, simultaneously driven (at the macro level) by the feasibility of transaction-cost manipulation and determining (at the micro level) the observed types of transactioncost manipulation strategies.
In what follows, I will use the example of public policies pertaining to long-latency disease-generating agents, since that is the focus of subsequent sections. However, the paradigm discussed below also may explain a wide variety of other public policies.
3.' Open Credit Claiming
Open credit claiming is the strategy of choice not only when, objectively, the associated benefits of a policy choice to a politician's constituents outweigh the aggregate costs (Weaver, I986: 379), but more generally when the political potency of the losers is smaller than that of the winners, even if the aggregate losses to losers outweigh aggregate gains to winners. Gains and losses, of course, must be (respectively) discounted and compounded to take into account the 'negativity bias' of voters. Nonetheless, in broad terms, high per capita gains to winners may inspire political activism capable of dominating low per capita but larger From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame 159 aggregate losses to losers, enabling politicians to claim credit for policy choices benefiting special interests without fear of reprisal from those harmed.
Essential to this outcome are per capita losses to losers that are -or can be made to appear -small. While substantial information asymmetries often characterize these situations, even with perfect information those experiencing small per capita losses often lack incentives to become politically active (e.g., consumers hurt by barriers to international trade). Without the ability to make potential per capita losses appear large, political entrepreneurs who might benefit from activating losers may be stymied by the losing constituency's lack of motivation. This political result thus does not depend on conspiracy among incumbents to benefit special interests. Political entrepreneurs or opposition parties simply will find it difficult to generate blame effectively unless expected or actual losses, per capita, become large enough to engage voters' political attention.
As the preceding example suggests, open credit claiming regarding a policy that creates numerous losers usually involves high natural transaction costs:4 that is, even if everyone attempted to minimize detrimental effects of transaction costs surrounding that policy issue, those costs would be large. High natural transaction costs might stem from the inherent complexity of an issue, low issue salience to constituents and the press, a naturally occurring concentration of benefits and dispersion of harm, or other circumstances.
But high natural transaction costs also facilitate transaction-cost augmentation, as the model's previously discussed determinants make clear. In these situations, congressional transaction-cost manipulation may involve spreading losses more widely than natural transaction costs dictate and fostering misinformation about the existence and nature of those losses. Such transaction-cost manipulation enables politicians to be open in their credit-claiming behavior, for those harmed in this case often fail to perceive either the nature or extent of the costs associated with the legislator's policy choice -and, even if they do, lack incentive to take political action.
3.2

Concealed Credit Claiming
As the availability of information about a public policy's adverse consequences grows, the feasibility and appeal of open credit claiming on behalf of the policy's beneficiaries diminishes. Provided that the nature of the harm is not yet common knowledge, however, there is still room (and incentive) for legislative action that benefits special interests while concealing from the general public the true extent of the policy's costs. i 6o
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Increased autonomy -to advance political or ideological objectivesagain is the postulated congressional motive.
At this stage, although natural transaction costs are falling, the balance has not tipped sufficiently to sustain entrepreneurial politics on behalf of the losers. Much of the increased information is likely to be in the hands of elites (policy specialists) within Congress, the executive branch, and elsewhere, groups whose economic and political interests often are aligned with the policy's traditional subgovernment relationships. These policy specialists often have much at stake economically and politically based on past actions (or expected future benefits) pertaining to the issue. To other groups, the policy issue at this stage is likely to remain obscure.
In these circumstances, the incentive grows for the congressional policy elite and other large stakeholders to manipulate transaction costs so as to conceal the harm and blunt Congress's and the public's responsiveness to it. This model of political behavior predicts more serious and aggressive efforts at cost concealment by these subgroups in such cases. Credit claiming thus will survive during this period, but that credit claiming will be subdued, targeted more specifically to special-interest audiences, and rendered more difficult for the general public to perceive. Of the four situations described in this section, this case is most conducive to transaction-cost augmentation aimed at those harmed by congressional policy choices.
Early-Stage Blame Avoidance
Blame-avoiding behavior is predicted to begin when the feasible bounds of transaction-cost manipulation contract so as to make it impossible to deceive the general public about adverse consequences of a policy choice. Entrepreneurial politics on the issue becomes viable. In this situation, Congress will begin to take a variety of blame-avoiding actions with respect to those potentially harmed by a policy choice, including appointment of study commissions, delegation of responsibility to administrative agencies, and other blame-mitigating strategies identified by Weaver (I986 
Full-Scale Blame Avoidance
Full-scale blame avoidance becomes the strategy of choice when the potential costs to the public of a policy decision are severe, and exogenously determined public knowledge of these costs is substantial and -from the politician's perspective -unavoidable. Here, concealing the costs is not a viable political option. In this situation it is no longer politically rewarding to claim credit on behalf of those who would benefit from a policy entailing these costs. Instead, political rewards flow from avoiding the blame cast by potential victims.
In such circumstances politicians have incentives to disclaim prior knowledge, blaming others for not acting decisively or not calling the situation to their attention. They may manipulate information so as to exaggerate the threat to the potential victims. The bigger the perceived threat the greater the credit politicians can claim for avoiding harm to potential victims -a coalescing of blame-avoidance and credit-claiming strategies discussed below. One implication is that overregulation, when it occurs, is most likely to occur in what I have labeled as a full-scale blame avoidance situation. By exaggerating the problem and encouraging a 'crisis' mentality, politicians may engender support for a greater governmental role in dealing with the supposed crisis (Higgs, I987: 62-67), thereby generating the greater electoral benefits associated with solving a problem of crisis proportions. The full range of blameavoidance strategies should be observed in this situation, with transaction-cost augmentation employed in service of the blame-mitigating objective.
Nonetheless Credit-claiming and blame-avoidance motivations typically coincide when officeholders in this situation find it advantageous to protect a policy's potential victims. When exogenous changes in political constraints dictate that officeholders alter their policies so as to avoid the blame of interests previously harmed, they will attempt to claim credit for protecting these interests while seeking to avoid blame for harm that (intentionally or unintentionally) slips -and has slipped -through the cracks. Beyond conceptualising credit claiming and blame avoidance as different 'lenses' for viewing the same behavior, therefore, we expect a symbiosis in such cases between officeholders' credit-claiming and blame-avoidance strategies with respect to a single interest group.
US Asbestos Policy: Credit and Blame
Asbestos -a carcinogen known to cause asbestosis (a progressive fibrosis of the lungs), lung cancer, mesothelioma (an extremely painful and always fatal cancer of the lining of the chest or stomach), and other cancers -has been called the 'pollutant of the century' (US House, I986a: 53). A general term denoting a group of fibrous minerals, asbestos long has been prized for its flexibility and its ability to withstand fire and chemicals. US congressional policy regarding asbestos provides evidence on the linkage between transaction-cost parameters confronting politicians, their choice of credit-claiming or blame-avoiding strategies, and their use of transaction-cost augmentation in service of the chosen strategies.
Congressional policies with respect to asbestos have run the gamut from open credit claiming to full-scale blame avoidance. As shown below, the timing of these policy changes appears consistent with the model presented in Section 3 while inconsistent with dominant-strategy models. Despite some overlap in the transition years, US asbestos policy has evolved as this model predicts in conjunction with identifiable changes in external constraints on transaction-cost augmentation. Until the mid-I 930s, federal asbestos policy was formulated in the absence of widespread understanding, by the public or by Congress, of the mineral's dangers. Despite the fact that, between I 9 I 3 and i 9 I 9, six states made asbestosis a compensable occupational disease -and despite the US Department of Labor's I9I8 report that insurance companies were refusing to insure asbestos workers because of their 'assumed health risks' -that knowledge had not been assimilated by most policymakers (Maguire, I 983: 597; US House, I 98 I: 34; Hoffman, I 9 I 8).
From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame
In this context, Congress took asbestos-related actions allowing members to claim credit with affected interest groups. The credit-claiming environment resembled that for domestic producers of nontoxic products -shoes, sugar, tin -in that affected politicians could engineer political approval of parochial measures without need to conceal service activities benefiting these constituencies.
Since the US has never been a major producer of raw asbestos fiber, congressional policy most often benefited domestic producers of manufactured asbestos products. Although parochial motivations at that time did not require concealment, transaction-cost augmentation was evident. Tariffs were put forth in the name of fairness and competition to 'equalize production cost' between US firms and foreign competitors. And when, under the National Recovery Administration, the asbestos products industry was given cartel-like powers in 1933, the new arrangement was called a 'code of fair competition'.
Credit Claiming, I945-I969
Understanding when government officials knew of asbestos-related health threats is crucial to the interpretation of asbestos policy after World War II. Elsewhere, I have documented early knowledge of the dangers of asbestos by many within government (Twight, I99I) . In
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Charlotte Twight what follows, we trace the widening sphere of such governmental understanding, with particular attention to congressional stockpiling policy, the Bureau of Mines, and the Navy. We will see that much of the information that might have inspired remedial congressional action on the asbestos issue during this period was concentrated in bureaucracies whose missions, cultures, and constraints discouraged aggressive action on this issue. Within the Navy, an aggressive stance regarding the negative health effects of asbestos would have seemed incompatible with the Navy's defense mission (especially during World War II); within the Bureau of Mines, such a stance would have seemed incompatible with that Bureau's commitment to mining interests. Congressional oversight in these areas, often aligned with the same interests, faced similar incentives. Those within Congress most likely to encounter the new information often had incentives to block its dissemination.
To the average member of Congress, the asbestos issue thus remained obscure. Given its complexity and lack of publicity, the issue gained little salience with either Congress at large or the public: hence, despite the new knowledge, no effective demand was placed on Congress for asbestos regulation. Existing institutional structures tended to compartmentalize emerging knowledge about asbestos hazards in agencies and committees with little incentive to pursue the issue.
However, by the mid-I930s, an important subset of government officeholders was aware of the by then 'widely accepted' scientific fact that inhalation of asbestos dust 'could cause asbestosis, often fatal' (US House, i982a: 58). There is contemporaneous evidence that some members of Congress were apprised of these dangers. The only significant change that occurred during this period is that credit-claiming opportunities with respect to asbestos interests were restructured in ways making them less apparent to the public.6 Federal policy continued to protect asbestos industry interests, enabling affected officeholders to claim credit with those groups. But credit-claiming opportunities were cultivated in ways unlikely to receive widespread public scrutiny. As shown below, transaction-cost augmentation was used both to misinform the public about the dangers of asbestos and to deflect adverse political reaction to pro-industry policies.
Stockpile policy typified Congress's posture during this period. With the war emergency past, asbestos stockpile policy became the province of special interests, administered without regard to its health consequences for the general public. After the war, through sales authorized by Congress, the government sold the bulk of the asbestos stockpile into the private market, attaching no warning or labeling requirement regarding the product's proper use (US Bureau of Mines, I946: 144). The government then undertook to stimulate and subsidize raw asbestos production in the United States. Using the Defense Production Act, the Domestic Minerals Program Extension Act of I953, and other laws, the government subsidized exploration for and production of asbestos, purchasing much of the new output for the stockpile even though it was acknowledged to be below stockpile quality. Similarly, the Navy's shipyard asbestos policies during this period served industry and the military bureaucracy to the detriment of shipyard asbestos workers and their families. Approximately 4.5 million workers were exposed to asbestos without warning of the hazard while working at government and contract shipyards during World War II. That the Navy knew of the hazard was indicated in a I941 memo from C. S. Stephenson, commander in charge of the Navy's Division of Preventive Medicine, stating that "'we are having a considerable amount of work done in asbestos and from my observations I am certain we are not protecting the men as we should. This is a matter of official report from several of our Navy yards"' (quoted in US House, i985a: i 86).
Although the Navy in I943 adopted the PHS standard for asbestos exposure, most shipyards did not meet the safety requirements, and the Navy did not enforce the standard (US House, ig8oa: 673-674). During the war that decision was understandable, consistent with imperatives of From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame I67 mission and culture in the Navy. However, well into the 1970s, the Navy withheld information from shipyard workers exposed to asbestos (US House, I985a: i86, 305). Although it carried out pulmonary function tests on some shipyard workers in the I960s, it did not inform them of the medical results, even when the exams disclosed abnormalities consistent with asbestos-related disease in a majority of the workers X-rayed (US House, I978: 268-27 I). Information about the asbestos hazard was not widely disclosed to shipyard workers until 1973, when the Navy first required caution signs and warnings regarding asbestos (US House, i983b: 205).
That both the Navy and BuMines took actions consistent with their respective missions and avoided raising bureaucratically relevant costs is not surprising. That Congress did not intercede also is not surprising, in light of the theory discussed in section 3. Congressional committees with oversight responsibilities were predominantly committed to the traditional missions of those bureaucracies. To the extent that they acquired knowledge, those committees had little incentive to publicize information about asbestos health risks that would interfere with traditional functions -for example, by raising the costs of achieving mission objectives. Dissemination of the knowledge thus was curtailed.
To the average member of Congress -and to the broader publicasbestos health issues remained relatively obscure during the I945-I969 period. Institutional structures compartmentalized knowledge in ways that permitted policy specialists to play traditional subgovernment politics long after a transaction-cost-minimising model of government would have predicted a major policy change. Officeholders did not switch to a blame-avoidance strategy to protect user interests as soon as other theories would have predicted. Through congressional stockpiling policy, Bureau of Mines industry propaganda, and Navy information manipulation, political actors continued to pursue policies for which they could (privately) claim credit with asbestos producer interests. The costs to more diffuse groups were obscured, their political action blunted. From a theoretical perspective, these developments signaled a major change in exogenously determined constraints on politicians' ability to use transaction-cost augmentation in support of policies enabling them to claim credit with asbestos producer groups. A much larger fraction of the general public and of Congress knew that asbestos was dangerous, and it was apparent that -quite outside the control of politicians -such understanding would grow, not diminish. Since it was no longer possible to use transaction-cost augmentation to prevent this widespread understanding of the dangers, a rational politician now would find himself better served by active policy measures to counteract blame for asbestosrelated harm. In light of the serviceability of established political relationships, however, we would expect some backsliding by policy specialists benefiting asbestos producer interests. Thus we expect the use of transaction-cost augmenting strategies by policy experts to protect producer interests within the broader movement to establish for Congress a credible facade of blame avoidance.
Blame
Consistent with the blame-avoidance model, in the I 970S and early
I980s
Congress passed numerous laws empowering federal agencies to deal with environmental hazards such as asbestos, as entrepreneurial politics on these issues drove the policy process. Among them were the Occupational Safety and Health Act ( 970), Clean Air Act amendments (I970), the Consumer Product Safety Act (I972), the Toxic Substances Control Act (1976) , and asbestos-in-schools laws described below. Here, we narrow our focus to asbestos-related uses of these broader powers. We will examine the congressional-bureaucratic policy nexus in asbestos regulations issued during this period by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, and the Environmental Protection Agency.
From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame I 69
Because agency decisionmaking is the product of many influencesnot only Congress, but also the President, executives within the agency, agency staff, judicial rulings, and so forth -it is not accurate to conceptualize the near-term regulatory process as necessarily dominated by congressional desires.8 Indeed, we will see evidence below of the sometimes powerful influence of executive branch pressure on agency regulatory decisionmaking.
However, in the long run, one cannot disregard congressional acquiescence in agency regulatory activity. If a majority disagrees with agency action, Congress can express its desire to alter that policy by remedial exercise of its power to authorize and appropriate, to control agency mission and resources. In asbestos policymaking (particularly the school asbestos regulations discussed below), Congress sometimes has done so. The effectiveness of those control mechanisms is a separate issue, one dependent on the severity of principal-agent problems between Congress and the agency in a specific context. That issue aside, unless the agencies or relevant oversight committees have successfully deceived Congress, longer elapsed time without congressional countermove thus renders more plausible the characterization of agency policy as a manifestation of Congress's (constrained) will.
The general pattern documented below is that of Congress in early blame-avoidance mode -delegating responsibility, requiring studies, fracturing responsibility among competing agencies, passing the buck, using the agencies as scapegoats -while often not countermanding regulatory decisions that shielded producer interests.
4.3.I Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
There is much more to the OSHA story than blame avoidance -institutional impediments embedded in administrative structure ( But appearances are misleading. By expressing the standard in fibers per cubic centimeter, OSHA made the rules seem more restrictive than they were. Since an average worker inhales 6 to Io million cubic centimeters of air on an 8-hour shift, the 1972 standard translated into 30,000,000 to 50,000,000 permissible fibers per shift, the I976 standard I2,000,000 to 20,000,000 permissible fibers. A 'fiber' was defined to exclude asbestos fibers 5 microns in length or shorter, so that unlimited exposure to shorter fibers was allowed over and above the permissible exposure limit for the longer fibers. Although apparently less toxic than the longer fibers (Mossman et al., I990), the shorter fibers were known to be capable of generating disease. Moreover, until I986 the regulations only attempted to protect workers from asbestosis, not from cancers triggered by much lower exposure levels.
In addition, OSHA regulations throughout this period specified a type of optical microscopy called phase contrast microscopy (PCM) as the accepted method for measuring ambient asbestos levels. Although cheaper than the alternative transmission electron microscopy (TEM) techniques, PCM is less reliable, prompting asbestos expert Anthony Natale to label use of optical microscopy as 'this little-understood scandal' (US House, I986a: 300). While acknowledging PCM's deficiencies, OSHA justified its decision based on its lower costs (5i Federal Register 22685, 20 June I 986).
Of course, there are legitimate arguments over the cost effectiveness, in a cost-benefit sense, of the alternative measurement techniques. In the circumstances, however, OSHA's asbestos regulations provided the best of both worlds for Congress. Delegation of responsibility -when coupled with apparently stringent regulations whose loopholes required technical knowledge to understand -virtually guaranteed that a congressman could avoid blame. Contrived increases in information costs reduced the risk that many would perceive the loopholes except those who benefited from them. And if they did, Congress had the agency as its scapegoat. It therefore makes political sense from a blame-avoidance perspective as well as an interest-group perspective that Congress over the years had 'harassed OSHA without fundamentally changing it' (Wilson, I989: 249).
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
When Congress delegated authority to the CPSC in 1972 to issue regulations to control hazards in consumer products, it put another blameavoidance mechanism in place. Any future problems with consumer From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame 17I products could be -and, in the case of asbestos, were -blamed on the agency.
The CPSC issued no regulations governing asbestos-containing consumer products until 1977, and Congress did not intervene. Household appliances and floor coverings, do-it-yourself household repair products, and even children's playthings (such as papier-mache containing up to 50 per cent asbestos) were sold throughout this period without labeling their asbestos content. In I977, the CPSC banned two asbestos-containing products particularly dangerous to homeowners: drywall patching compounds and asbestos-containing emberising agents used in fireplaces. Labeling requirements were not established until I986 (5I Federal Register 33910, 24 September I986).
An incident particularly revealing of the prevailing blame-avoidance posture involved congressional reaction to the CPSC's treatment of asbestos-containing hairdryers. In 1977 the CPSC commissioned a report that found approximately i oo consumer products, including hand-held hairdryers, to contain asbestos. The CPSC initially chose not to pursue the issue. When a television station had the hairdryers tested, one in five contained asbestos, some discharging asbestos fibers 'in the same range' as asbestos levels deemed hazardous in public schools (US Senate, I979: 3-4). These results, presented to the CPSC on 24 March 1979, were broadcast on television four days later. Only then did Congress act: the chairman of the CPSC was called on the carpet in congressional hearings, providing representatives ample opportunity to excoriate the agency and to distance themselves from it politically (US House, 1979: 78-84). A blame-avoidance mechanism was in place, and legislators used it.
Of course blame avoidance by Congress is by no means the only explanation of the CPSC experience. Much has been written about the effects of CPSC's status as a multi-member independent commission, the overall paucity of its regulatory activity, its reluctance to regulate chronic hazards, its choice of regulations with no significant effect on safety, and its adoption of regulations not warranted from a cost-benefit perspective (Viscusi, I984). On the congressional side, however, blame avoidance has been an important part of that story.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
The EPA's asbestos air emissions and asbestos-in-schools regulations during this period exemplify ways in which blame-avoiding strategies were coupled with regulations that delivered less than they seemed to promise, making it difficult for the public to assess asbestos-related risks under the chosen regulatory structure. While the executive branch was They were useful first steps. However, unbeknownst to the average citizen, the 'no visible emissions' standard did not insulate the surrounding populace from asbestos-related disease. As experts inside and outside of government knew, asbestos fibers too small to be seen by the naked eye were highly toxic and long implicated in the etiology of asbestos-related disease. While the regulations offered some protection, they delivered much less than a nonspecialist would have inferred from their language, thereby shielding asbestos industry interests from political pressure for more costly cleanup efforts.
Regulations governing sprayed-on asbestos followed a similar pattern. 
From Claiming Credit to Avoiding
Attempts to Limit Government Liability
Any discussion of government blame avoidance during this period would be incomplete without reference to the US government's overt denials of asbestos-related liability and attempts to limit that liability via statutory law. Throughout the 1970S and early i980S, as asbestos litigation multiplied, government officials consistently disclaimed tort liability to asbestos victims. As J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney General in the US Department ofJustice, put it in I982, 'It is the basic position of the Government -and we have taken this in all the litigations -that the Government has no tort liability; that is, no liability in tort, to the victims of asbestos disease' (US House, i982b: 5). Federal officials contended that the government's only potential liability was workers' compensation to federal employees under the Federal Employees' Com-From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame 175 pensation Act, arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity precluded asbestos tort claims.
As the I980s progressed, Congress investigated alternative settlement mechanisms, such as the private and voluntary Wellington group asbestos claims facility (US Senate, I985b). Concurrently, after its bankruptcy declaration in I982, the Manville Corporation (formerly Johns-Manville, the largest US asbestos firm) worked towards formation of a trust fund to compensate victims in lieu of judicial remedies. Fearing that the government might be the only remaining deep pocket if asbestos companies were destroyed by the extraordinary legal costs they were experiencing, Congress had strong incentives to facilitate these endeavors.
Meanwhile, members of Congress introduced numerous bills that would have curtailed asbestos victims' rights to pursue tort remedies against asbestos product manufacturers and the government. Although put forth as victim compensation bills, a critical provision in each was an 'exclusive remedy' clause that restricted the victim's compensation to amounts awarded under the bill's provisions." While parochial motives were sometimes transparent, some of these bills had a broad base of congressional support.'2 Endorsing such measures gave the politically valuable appearance of support for victims' interests, while the exclusive-remedy provisions and limitations on governmental liability reduced the political cost of conveying that impression.
In the end, however, the changing informational context that gave increased political viability to victims' interest groups frustrated these maneuvers. Despite much testimony in numerous hearings, the bills were stymied by conflicting interest-group pressures, 13 as members of Congress discovered that endorsement of such legislation would provoke blame. Interest groups were vocal on both sides of these bills, with victims' groups testifying to their 'unanimous outrage at this legislation' while industry representatives endorsed the measures (US Senate, i985a: 3I, 92, I26). In not passing the bills, Congress again took a blame-avoiding stance.
Blame Avoidance, I986-I989
Developments inside and outside of government contributed to changing public perceptions of asbestos health hazards in the early to mid-ig8os. Inside government, activity surrounding the above-described legislative proposals increased public awareness of the issue. Jumping on the bandwagon [another blame-avoidance strategy identified by Weaver ( By I986, circumstances thus were conducive to what I have labeled full-scale blame avoidance by federal policymakers. However, as noted in section 3.4, when Congress shifts from supporting the constituency formerly benefited by a policy (e.g., asbestos industry interests) to supporting the constituency previously harmed by that policy (e.g., asbestos victims), there is a mingling of blame-avoiding and credit-claiming motifs implicit in many policy actions. Measures adopted during this stage often may be characterized either as blame avoidance ('Don't blame me; I supported a statute mitigating harm to asbestos victims') or credit claiming ('Give me credit; I supported a statute mitigating harm to asbestos victims'). As discussed earlier, the theory does not rest on how we label this shift. Rather, the theory's central focus is the political environment for transaction-cost augmentation and its role in the timing of this change in constituent interests effectively driving the policy process.
Again, during this stage the appearance of not meriting blame rather than the reality of not taking blameworthy actions is the expected congressional desideratum. Theory here suggests political exaggeration of asbestos dangers coupled with dramatic steps to counteract the asserted crisis, accompanied by attribution of blame to others for past and present problems. In general, the greater public awareness and greater susceptibility of the issue to (blame-generating) oversimplification by rival politicians at this stage render likely more extreme congressional countermeasures. While this article does not attempt to specify optimal asbestos regulations, the incentives for transaction-cost augmentation in From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame I77 managing toxic substances thus invite regulation that is first late, then inadequate, and finally perhaps excessive.
In this context, the US government adopted two regulations most often cited as instances of overregulation: the I987 asbestos-in-schools regulations and the I989 EPA asbestos product ban. The school regulations have been criticized for imposing huge costs on schools while often worsening rather than mitigating asbestos-related risks (US Senate, The EPA issued the required AHERA rules on 30 October I987 (52 Federal Register 4I826, 30 October I987). Besides requiring local education agencies (LEAs) to have schools inspected by accredited inspectors and to develop a management plan for any ACM found, the new rules designated the circumstances in which five possible response actions could be undertaken by the LEAs. In addition, the regulations specified testing procedures to be used to ascertain completion of response actions, requiring the phasing in of transmission electron microscopy (TEM) testing over a two-year period.
Of most significance here, however, is the manner in which the EPA developed these regulations. Using what Congress and the EPA called 'regulatory negotiation' or negotiated rulemaking, the 'EPA established a committee of representatives of interested organizations, and charged them with the task of writing ... a comprehensive regulatory proposal.' With Congress's tacit approval, the EPA delegated its responsibility to draft the AHERA regulations, openly committing itself 'to proposing whatever the committee can agree on' (US House, I987b: 66, 126). That it did, and the committee's proposals were adopted.
Whatever its virtues in reducing bureaucratic costs and encouraging early compromise, the process provided an ideal vehicle for blame avoidance at the congressional as well as agency levels. When complaints arise regarding the I987 AHERA regulations, Congress -having passed the buck to the EPA -can use the EPA as its scapegoat, and the EPA in turn can blame the actual interest-group decisionmakers to whom it passed the buck. As predicted by the theory, Congress with its AHERA policies positioned itself to gain high-profile credit for preventing asbestos-related harm to school children while establishing a protective institutional web to facilitate blame avoidance.
I989 Asbestos Product Ban
Through the I976 Toxic Substances Control Act, Congress delegated broad powers to the EPA to regulate toxic substances when piecemeal regulation by other agencies was deemed insufficient to protect public health. In I984, the EPA attempted to use these powers to phase down and ban the use of certain asbestos products. However, its initial attempts were thwarted by opposition from industry interests and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Twight, i99i). Executive pressure drove the outcome, as OMB used its regulatory review authority 5 under Executive Order 1229I to 'surreptitiously relay the position of interested parties' in a way that the House subcommittee on oversight and investigations deemed 'an unlawful abuse of power' (US House, i985b: 387; I985c: 7).
Criticized by some members of Congress for this capitulation to OMB and industry pressure (US House, I985b, I985c), the EPA renewed its resolve to press forward with the regulations. The EPA reformulated its proposal so as to accommodate OMB's criticisms, gained OMB's approval, and announced its proposed rulemaking on 2gJanuary i 986.
Despite this approval, however, OMB's resistance continued. It met off the record with Canadian officials to assuage their concerns regarding Canada's asbestos interests, describing OMB's strategies for continued opposition to the EPA rule. OMB official Robert Bedell coached the Canadians on ways to oppose the EPA's proposal and invited them to submit additional information directly to OMB. This case is remarkable for several reasons. First, we again encounter Congress's blame-avoiding predilection to delegate responsibility. Second, we see strong evidence of asbestos industry influence on federal decisionmakers, reflected in executive branch pressure on the EPApressure strong enough to block even the proposal for rulemaking until I986. Third, the increase in congressional pressure on the EPA to resist the OMB and industry interests occurred beginning in I985, about the time when the exogenous political constraint of public awareness became conducive to full-scale blame avoidance. At the expected time, Congress positioned itself politically to claim credit for dealing with asbestos hazards now more fully understood by the public, simultaneously insulating itself from blame for any political missteps by the EPA.
While some wonder why it took until I989 to initiate a ban on products known to be hazardous for decades, others view this as an instance of overregulation (Morrall, I986; Viscusi, I989: 99-Ioo).
From the theoretical perspective of this paper, neither occurrence is unexpected. Observed policymaking in this instance -whether or not these particular regulations are judged economically inefficient -is fully consistent with the predicted responsiveness of congressional policy to changing political constraints on transaction-cost augmentation.
Implications for Future Research
This paper has described the choice between credit claiming and blame avoidance as a function of officeholders' ability to practice transactioncost augmentation. Transaction costs facing the public on political issues have been shown to be malleable within bounds whose scopefrom the government's perspective -is determined both endogenously and exogenously. We have seen that the model yields distinctive predictions about the timing of public policy changes and about the types of transaction-cost augmentation likely to accompany open credit claiming, concealed credit claiming, early-stage blame avoidance, and fullscale blame avoidance.
Whereas other models imply that a change from credit claiming to blame avoidance will occur when officeholders recognize that a policy imposes high per capita costs on a sizeable portion of their constituency, this model predicts that the change is most likely to occur when exogenously determined constraints on transaction-cost augmentation make it impossible for officeholders to blunt the negative electoral conse-
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Charlotte Twight quences of the harm-generating policy. This model further predicts that, until such a political environment materializes, officeholders will use transaction-cost augmentation to sustain credit-claiming strategies on behalf of the policy's beneficiaries.
In the future, the model's predictions can be assessed against the evolution of policies pertaining to issues other than the asbestos case examined here. For example, further research might investigate the evolution of the US government's hazardous waste policies, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit reduction law and its implementation, Forest Service policies, nuclear power policies, savings and loan industry policies, and other policy issues for consistency with the predictions of this model.
Future research might also explore the degree to which the US experience is exceptional. Political striving for power, autonomy, and esteem is not confined to the US. While constraints will differ internationally, political manifestations of credit claiming and blame avoidance involving transaction-cost augmentation can be expected to be apparent in cultures and institutional contexts outside the US.
Of course, differences in political institutions strongly affect politicians' ability to control information flows and other types of transaction costs, and hence their ability to claim credit or avoid blame. Consequently, this model offers extensive opportunities for cross-cultural comparison and prediction with respect to specific governmental policies. If, as this model suggests, policy-specific transaction costs facing citizens are politically malleable, one can make predictions concerning how the incentive and ability to practice transaction-cost augmentation in specific policy contexts will differ in different countries.
Institutional inducements for this behavior will vary depending on a nation's political structure (e.g., authoritarian or democratic regime), economic status (e.g., Third World or industrialized nation), and other variables. Based on the institutional structure of government and upon the nation's level of economic development, this model would generate different predictions concerning the evolution of asbestos (or some other) policy in India or China than in the United States. The incentive for government officials to practice transaction-cost augmentation regarding an issue like asbestos is undoubtedly greater the poorer the nation, while their ability to practice transaction-cost augmentation is greater the more extensive the government's political power and the less educated the citizenry. 16 Consistent with these expectations, Dahl (i 989) reported that Canada currently 'is exporting close to half its asbestos to the Third World, where many workers are still oblivious to its dangers. ' The incentive to practice transaction-cost augmentation also depends on the economic importance of relevant interest groups in a country. As From Claiming Credit to Avoiding Blame I8I we have seen, Canada, one of the world's largest asbestos producers, not only has attempted to manipulate US asbestos policy but also has conducted major promotional efforts in Third World countries that lack both knowledge about asbestos and a regulatory framework for dealing with it (Sentes, I989). Canada has made major inroads in Thailand, where 'Construction workers, who didn't even know what asbestos was, were enveloped in clouds of dust as they used power saws to cut asbestos cement pipes and sheeting,' and 'Outside the plant the workers' children were roaming the company compound among discarded equipment, empty asbestos bags, and mounds of waste asbestos' (Sentes, I989: 7). That the balance of producer, user, and consumer interests affects outcomes also seems consistent with the Swedish experience (Kelman, I98I: 77-80). More detailed evaluation of these and related issues in an international context awaits further research.
If this model accurately portrays a characteristic aspect of political decisionmaking, one may reflect on its policy implications. Given a policy issue such as asbestos with substantial but difficult to detect adverse effects on a particular constituency segment, and given policymakers' predilection for transaction-cost augmentation, which of the four policy stances discussed in Section 3 is most likely to facilitate decisionmaking in accord with the views of an informed citizenry? Perhaps none.
In the presence of transaction-cost augmentation, open or concealed credit claiming is clearly incompatible with citizens' ability to make informed risk-benefit tradeoffs. These policy stances tend to stifle the information dissemination that would facilitate individual choice based on risk aversion and opportunity costs. Preliminary blame avoidance has the virtue of impelling actions that spread risk information to the general public and discouraging further credit-claiming actions on behalf of industry interests that would exacerbate the harm. However, this policy mien characteristically spawns measures that promise more than they deliver, imparting false perceptions of security. Full-scale blame avoidance, by comparison, involves added potential to inspire unjustifiably burdensome regulation.
Officeholders will continue to augment transaction costs subject to prevailing constraints. Citizens will continue to receive information distorted by politicians' efforts to shape it to their own ends. Policymaking will be improved to the extent that institutional structure facilitates competition in these information-generation functions, thereby more rapidly and more severely constraining self-serving political attempts to keep public knowledge in check.
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Charlotte Twig4ht some financial responsibility' for claims in asbestos lawsuits brought by shipyard workers (US House, I984: 2). 16. The extraordinary pollution levels in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union seem consistent with these suppositions. Also seemingly consistent is the fact that, when home-country asbestos regulations were tightened, British firms moved overseas to India, where they maintained piles of asbestos waste open to children who played on it (US House, 1983b: 301 ).
